



Article

# The Three Models of Populist Style and Their Impact on Television Programs: Iraqi Media as a Model

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**Abstract:** World News & International Affairs When some people are at a news conference, they participate only as an audience. What the media displays is just like a hardcore rally on the Iraq satellite television station Al-Juburi. How media's favor adds (intention) impatience. One common media reception thus conveys bits of Ubiquitous hope or (remounted as) despair: Tired Popular Rhetoric, feeding the last "use." Since audiences are first of all human beings who want a positive life towards their quest for light and warmth, we cannot let a mean data set like this prove the fate of Populism as humanity! If we take a step back and consider the implications of using "syndicalist" without quotation marks to contrast it with "fascist" or "anti-semitic" we will see that in fact all these forms of discourse are alike—they all have their unrealistic and absurd ideas about whole classes, non-indigenous peoples etc. a) for one thing long-standing attitudes were incompatible with democratic legitimacy—historically its largest beneficiaries have been the demons of (roundabout language: fairness and systemic failure) Taiwan's corruption and decay; b) in another respect many Chinese people feel that being "big" or appearing authoritative makes for good leaders when dealing with foreigners—they say therefore that these findings baldly display how Iraq's huge economic crisis has (through reductive narratives which pass on tribal and sectarian hues); c) but just as numerous capitalists think highly of bureaucracy and undertake selective criticism or insertion, so, political theorists then ought to propose a variety of wraps that suit all local tastes (even if such inconsistencies would bother Spiro Agnew) Third, we use "through" as a conjunction for all our examples. The uprisings meet resistance at higher educational levels ( $\beta=-0.12$  to  $-0.34$ ) as well as for audiences with more political information ( $\beta=-0.03$  to  $-0.09$ ). Therefore these less developed areas are crucial targets for the enlightenment work that must come next. Second, when we look at media platforms, the structure offers interesting differences. Unlike for example official channels ( $\beta=-0.18$ ), local programs ( $\beta=0.28$ ) and religious education all are positively linked to this phenomenon. This structure, partially as a result of mild preferences for entertainment ( $\beta=0.05-0.07$ ), increasingly one-sidedness ( $\beta=0.30$ ), and the fact that even weakly polarized states are likely to have a moderating effect on polarization levels increases the number of places left remaining where these acts can take hold. So as a result, some of these shows become stages for explicit or implicit stereotypes—none left open to the other side. The rival model had a significant  $R^2$  ( $\lambda=0.54$ ), which suggests that Iraq's media has moved from news that leans in favour of the state to news as a social power of sorts. So when faced with what is obviously such a major, kernel problem, people cannot help wondering: How can we find ways of arranging the Iraqi news scene to ensure both freedom of the press and social responsibility would become virtuous positive forces? On the other hand, this type of positioning can achieve the effect: both social ethics and making something profitable can be done through open media.

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## 1. Introduction

Although Trump criticizes the fake news of CNN which is known among his fans, he actually after winning election retracted his promise to cancel subscriptions should. But despite the fact that populist talk in political discourse and news has attracted a significant amount of academic attention there's been comparatively little on sorts of it you find on telly, which surely has more reach, influence and clout than anything gossip columnists have to say about Farage. Populism is made of both populist style and a populist meaning, how entertainment formats, talk shows and scripted output underpin – or contest – narratives of populism (Block Elena & Ralph Negrine 2017: p 180).

Tantalising new book examines TV as a cultural and ideological medium that constitute and shape public understandings of politics, society and identity. Populist discourse based on a binary opposition between “the people” and the “elites” or the “outsiders,” has a fertile ground in TV formats that depend on emotional engagement, simplified plots, and charismatic figures. Whether it's the reality TV celebration of the “ordinary” person, satirical shows that ridicule political elites, or dramas placing protagonists against corrupt institutions, television normalizes populist logics that the news media does not (Çavdar, 2024: p61).

In part, the study draws on media populism theory (Mazzoleni, 2008; Krämer, 2014) to examine how televisual techniques—such as framing, narrative structure and direct address (Silverstone and Hirsch; Thompson 1998)—create populist effect. Beyond Thus entertainment programming turns the camera on itself in ways like this piece of research: In addition, this paper gives a nod towards finding a teacher of drama in order that its findings can be profitably taught to students with difficulties. Accordingly how do the dramas and films reproduced on TV screens get modified to promote popular ideas? How far can such a shift in emphasis create a subversive mood? Do such images and expressions conform to reality? How do these images and expressions fit into the broader context of society, from which they take their reason for being?

By referring to three characteristic cases we can achieve a more comprehensive overview of how world media aids the rise of populism. If we were to pay attention on the cultural resonances from which populism is like old-people it appears that both television and radio so far as media are naturally fitted here. In a time when entertainment and politics have become almost indistinguishable how Veronica populism works is the evidence of what one Forde investigator said in his turn can".

### Theoretical Framework and Research Literature Review

In the cause of communication, the radical essence of cocaine aims at emotion. In the mind of the team, it creates a "We and them", or else produces joy to one another out sorrow or anger. This is about leadership charm. Reality TV is especially bad in this respect; even referential film and political talk, however, dramatically help develop the codes of such shows. It bears absolutely no reflection on reality. (Marx 2025: 148)

#### Elements of Populism in Television

"Us versus them" dichotomy: Populist television programs often establish a clear distinction between groups, emphasizing differences and conflicts to engage viewers emotionally and politically (Amado, 2025: p91).

Detonating emotions: These programmes rely on emotional narrative and dramatic storytelling in order to appeal to the audience on a deep emotional level, as is especially common in reality television (Cunha, 2025: p427).

Cult of Personality: The populist television phenomenon often revolves around charismatic hosts or participants, creating a cult of personality that helps both the show and its stars to thrive and become influential (adapted from Zúquete and Pimenta, 2025: p155).

Populism: populism is an ideology (Hobbes, 1651) Many populist television programs reflect conservative values, they are promoting traditional concepts of family, nation, country and social order (Hutchens, Shaughnessy and DuBosar 2025: p51)

Reality shows; shows such as MasterChef, O Ces Turkiye and Survivor in Turkey are various examples of populist approaches that are beginning to be integrated into reality TV and affecting the cultural and political narratives (Kaptan and Algan, 2025: p3).

Data-driven insight: Even public broadcasters may inadvertently promote populist agendas by addressing topics that excite strong emotions, including immigration and religious issues (Priyowidodo, 2025).

Just as the Tea Party movement leader, Rick Santilli, leveraged public outrage over the financial bailout of banks, television programming using emotive language that will provoke feeling (fear of the "elite," anger over the "corruption" of the elites). Certain talk shows vilify politicians as enemies of the people or provide theatrical remedies to intricate economic problems (Santamaria et al., 2011).

TV Programs establishing themselves as "populist" thus creating emotional ties with which to form opinion Such programs frequently reinforce traditional values and may lead to social polarization by emphasizing differences between groups (Amalia et al., 2025).

The impact of populism on television programs can be understood by analyzing the American Tea Party movement, which began in 2009, and how populist rhetoric is used in the media to stir emotions and shape public opinion. Populism, whether in politics or the media, relies on a binary discourse that divides society into "good people" and a "corrupt elite," emphasizing emotions over rationality and simplistic promises for complex problems (Kushwaha, 2017: p88).

At its core, populism rests on a moral and political dualism that divides society into the "good people" and the "guilty other" — the ruling elite, cultural minorities or migrants. The two sides of this dualism are embodied in different ways depending on what kind of populist discourse we are talking about. This can at times be referred to as anti-establishment populism (when the emphasis is placed on class differences, and the masses struggling against political and economic elites), but also exclusionist populism (when the clash between the so-called "native people" and minorities, or immigrants, is at the heart of the populist discourse) (Dai 2024).

Populist discourse emerges in the media in the form of three different patterns journalists draw upon when reporting about events:

People-centrism: framing "the will of the people" as the source of truth and legitimacy.

Anti-elitism: depicting political and economic elites as corrupt or disconnected from sufferers of the citizenry.

Cultural monocentrism: focusing on just one element of identity, cultural or ethnic, as a measure of national affiliation, with systematic exclusion of the other "the different other (Baydar Çavdar, 2024)".

These media tendencies are tightly connected to the fundamental public traits of populism: anti-elite and exclusionary. For instance, right-wing populist newspapers (the Austrian Kronen Zeitung, for example) have research from a while back showing that not only do they reinforce anti-immigrant sentiment through exclusionary rhetoric, but this has some influence on the (rhetoric of) readership. Yet, most of these studies have only investigated the right-wing populist phenomenon in isolation, failing to pay attention to the role of the media in strengthening the anti-elite dimension, despite it's at the heart of populists' discourse world-wide (Bobba et al., 2025: p181).

Findings from a field study with a representative sample of Dutch citizens (N = 809) show that populist sympathisers (anti-elite and exclusionary) are attracted to populist

types of media. That is, anti-elite and exclusionary discourse are linked to preference for media characterized by harsh criticism of political elite (left) and enlargement of the national community based on fear of minorities (right). [The patterns apparent in these results, while not showing a direct chain of causality, indicate very strong correlations between populism among the audience']Median voters' populist attitudes and party MPs for both populist parties. and the media they choose - or visa versa - even after controlling for non-media influences such as social or economic status (Çoban and İnceoğlu, 2025: p11).

Relevant for the phenomenon is a body of research literature indicating that (a) media-use and populist attitudes are interconnected, thus (b) the nature of these connections is quite intricate. populist people per se have the specific tendency to prefer tabloid/entertainment media consumption. Explanations for this link is the nature of populism and those characteristics that are characteristic wit tabloid media ( Wirz, Sys Wirth, 2025: p174).

In effect, tabloidism and populism are united by the same "high" ideological structure, centered on the division between "ordinary people" and "corrupt elites." Populism has a discourse that lifts the status of common people and question elite institutions, and tabloid media provides content that foregrounds the lives of ordinary individuals, bypassing elite sources. This similarity in perspective makes tabloid media especially appealing for those with populist leanings, who exhibit low levels of trust in the status quo system of politics (Mahlouly, 2025: p193).

Elite or serious media, by comparison, lean more on expert sources and official institutions, and apply more stringent standards of objectivity to their news stories. Due to these features, it is less appealing to populist types, as its rhetoric clashes with their skeptical stance toward elites and institutions. Other studies have also pointed to this trend, with critiques of mainstream media finding themselves increasingly likely to take potshots at populist leaders as a result. This may have something to do with drawing constituents even further away from their political product and hence endangering its survival prospects. (Stein, Lübcke & Engemann 2025 : 282)

The tendency to select media that affirms a listener's pre-existing beliefs, attitudes and worldviews is called selective exposure theory. The style of tabloid media appeals directly to special interests and satisfies the criteria of populism as well; just like those people who dismiss anything serious or reliable as part of the system that they are anti- (Bobba et al., 2025: p.181).

Since media often translate content and distribution so that people who could not previously obtain it can now access it through television and film, these are two types of media combination. The twisted juncture where mass media habits intersect with popular expression makes key points clear: media has power to counteract or aid populism. Media frequently provide framings and interpretations which reflect or even reinforce the populist attitudes of their target public (Humprecht et al 2024: p. 559).

As well as consuming higher amounts of entertainment and soft news in absolute terms than supporters of other political parties, supporters of populist parties process this information through a different ideologically matched media sieve.

This is more than a simple preference of media but instead it suggests that the quality of content and model-building processes are more intimately associated with attempts to influence political beliefs (Novais and Leite, 2014).

We can best think of this relationship at the point where one line, representing the core values of populism crosses another line, denoting some key features of entertainment content including that it is lived through. Both prioritise the lives of 'ordinary' persons and contain a critique of elites and the status quo. In light news and entertainment shows, we evade official institutional speech and provide stories from the perspectives of the

“people,” which coincides with populist rhetoric that exalts the people while disdaining experts. (Cunha, 2025: p429)

There’s a correlation between heavy consumption of entertaining materials and political cynicism, which also predicts openness to populist ideas. Those who are consuming primarily entertainment media tend to have a more cynical view of the world; those who consume serious news sources come closer to having an academic, pro-establishment perspective. On the other hand, people exposed to a balanced consideration and an elite perspective are less likely to produce populist speeches because this type of exposure gets-pan style awareness against anti-establishment sentiment (Zúquete and Pimenta, 2025: p. 159).

Populist media content and audience form a dialectical relationship, mutually strengthening and shaping each other in a spiral fashion. In this populist tale that the tabloids and entertainment might take up in society, it may be downloaded into the veins of mainstream news “as ‘the dominant mode of political speech’” and transform into “the central form of political discourse” (Hutchens, childress & DuBosar 2025:58). Popular media relies on what is known as the “populist master frame,” which divides the world into a simple binary: “good people” versus “guilty others,” whether this other represents corrupt elites (vertical discrimination) or minorities and outsider groups (horizontal discrimination). This simplistic frame presents a polarized view of political and social reality, as exemplified by the example of the British newspaper, *The Mirror*, which portrayed ordinary Britons as victims of austerity while the wealthy grew richer (Bobba et al., 2025: p185). Such media coverage does not merely mirror but also actively shapes reality by perpetuating negative stereotypes about the “other” and thus validating a conflictual view of society. Populist media can be divided into three categories:

The first is “people-centric,” sometimes called “empty populism,” where the media make coverage about the will of the ordinary citizen as opposed to treating institutional or expert perspectives as key reports. This pattern is evident in entertainment television programs and tabloid newspapers, which place the ordinary viewer at the center of events (Wirz and Wirth, 2025: p177).

The second type is “anti-elite populism,” which focuses on building a clear hostility toward political and economic elites and experts, viewing them as untrustworthy and disconnected from the concerns of ordinary citizens. In this context, institutional analyses and formal statements become suspect, and “street wisdom” and the daily experiences of the common folk take precedence (Stein, Luebke and Engelmann, 2025: p287).

Third, it is monocultural populism, in which culturally/ethnically diverse voices are systematically excluded; national identity is seen as only and exclusively in the hands of the (presumed) “native” citizen. Segregation of society is starting to homogenize voting behavior, consolidating the feeling of minorities and refugees as a common enemy threatening the fabric of society (Bobba et al., 2025: p186).

Varied populist styles shape how audiences respond to these types of media. Elite-bashing content with a people-centered language facilitates anti-elite publics, while materials that argue in favor of one identity over minorities can attract exclusionary readers. The people-centred style, by emphasizing popular unity instead of targeted enemies, appeals to different sections within the populist base (Humprecht et al., 2024: 568).

Media is a political actor (unlike a neutral carrier) but rather operates by projecting perceptions and disseminating interpretations. Most importantly, populist media serves as a major instrument of fulfilling Paris's (2009) strategy in “Framing the Other” through its choice of topics and mannerism. This phenomenon creates separative, antagonistic group identities fixed into one social zone. It is also the self-reproduction catalyst for ‘populism’, as an auto-feedback loop is continually reinforced.

## 2. Materials and Methods

### Sample

To ensure that data would reflect the distribution of different groups in Iraq, a random sample of 1000 people from Iraq's different regions -- Baghdad, Mosul, Basra and Erbil -- was taken. Study subjects were contacted by email and social media, and their privacy and confidentiality guaranteed. Finally, a total of 720 responses were obtained. (This is about 72% response rate for a survey to the best of my knowledge, which is quite decent in Iraq.)

Across the country, 51% of respondents were male and 49% female; the median age was 35 years Old. The distribution of education could be described as follows: 22.0% primary school, 45.1 % high school, 32.9 percent college. Regional distribution was as follows: 35% had their homes in Baghdad, while 65% lived far from it. Validity was confirmed as both viewership and demography of Iraq were adequately covered by the people who responded to this survey. We protected credibility and cultural relevance by framing the survey and analysis in terms of Iraq's particular context. This method enables us to carefully study the image of populist message dissemination on TV and other media from the perspectives of people in the Iraqi street from their special circumstances post-2003 Iraq.

### Measures

#### Anti-elite populist attitudes

Anti-elite populist attitudes were measured using four statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.71. The statements were:

- a. The people, not politicians, should make the most important political decisions.
- b. Most politicians in government are corrupt.
- c. Politicians make decisions that harm the interests of ordinary citizens.
- d. Ordinary citizens should have more influence in political decisions than corporations seeking only profit.

#### Exclusionary Populist Attitudes

Exclusionary attitudes were measured using six statements (Cronbach's alpha of 0.91):

- a. Immigrants threaten the purity of our culture.
- b. Immigrants cost our country a lot of money that should be spent on our citizens.
- c. Our borders should be closed to immigrants.
- d. Immigrants are responsible for many of our country's problems.
- e. Social benefits, such as health insurance, are given to people who do not deserve them.
- f. People who are not of Iraqi origin are not entitled to our social benefits.

#### Television Program Preferences

Audience preferences were measured by:

- a. Political talk show viewing.
- b. Entertainment and drama program viewing.
- c. News channel viewing was measured using a scale from 1 (rarely) to 5 (regularly).

Data were processed using appropriate statistical methods. Taking into account the cultural and social characteristics of the Iraqi audience, the results showed a clear link between exposure to certain types of television programs and the adoption of populist trends.

### Measurement Tools in the Iraqi Study

#### Measuring Exposure to Television Programs

- a. Television programs were divided into two main types:
- b. Serious (news/analytical) programs: such as Iraq News Program on Al-Mustaqilla Channel
- c. Serious political dialogue programs: such as " With Mulla Talal" on UTV satellite channel
- d. Entertainment (light) programs: such as Dialogue and Melody program on the Iraqi General Channel

### **Social talk shows**

Respondents were asked how many days per week they watched each type of program, and responses were converted into a binary variable (watched/not watched) to simplify the analysis.

#### Measuring Viewer Preferences

A scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) was used to measure:

#### Entertainment Program Preferences:

- a. "I enjoy spending an entire evening watching entertainment programs and movies"
- b. Serious Program Preferences:
- c. "I hate missing out on the news"
- d. "I like complex news reports even if they require my full attention to understand them"
- e. Number of days participants watch newscasts
- f. Measuring Populist Content Preferences

Three types of populist content preferences were measured: Focus on the common people:

- a. "The media should pay more attention to the opinions of ordinary people like me"
- b. Anti-elitism:
- c. "The media devotes more space to elites at the expense of the common people" (reversed)
- d. Monoculturalism:
- e. "The media devotes too much space to minorities in society" (reversed)
- f. These items were verified to measure different dimensions through confirmatory factor analysis, taking into account Iraqi specificity in the formulation of the items to suit the local context.

### **Non-Media Factors Influencing the Iraqi Study**

#### Demographic and Cognitive Variables:

Educational Level: Participants were categorized into two groups: low-education (less than a bachelor's degree) and high-education (bachelor's degree or higher).

#### Political Knowledge:

- a. Measured using three questions:
  - b. Identification of the two main ruling parties
  - c. Name of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs
  - d. Name of the leader of one of the main political parties
- Score from 0 (all answers are wrong) to 3 (all answers are right)

#### Sense of Relative Deprivation:

Measured using three statements on a scale of 1 to 5:

- a. "When we ask for something from the government, we ordinary people expect more than others"
- b. "I have never received what I truly deserve"
- c. "There are always others who benefit from services and benefits"

### **Attitudes on Social and Political Issues:**

Attitudes on three main issues were assessed on a scale of 1 to 5:

**Identity and Integration:**

- a. "Immigrants should maintain their original culture" versus "They should fully adapt to our Iraqi culture"
- b. Integration Regional:
- c. "Cooperation with neighboring countries is insufficient" vs. "Cooperation with neighboring countries has exceeded acceptable limits"
- d. Economic Justice:
- e. "Class differences in society must be reduced" vs. "Class differences must be increased as an economic incentive"

These questions were formulated with Iraqi specificity in mind to accurately reflect the local context, while emphasizing the most pressing issues in Iraqi reality, such as identity, belonging, and social justice.

**Table 1.** Regression analysis of the anti-elite dimension in populist trends.

Variable	Mobilizational (Incitement) Model	Entertainment (Popular Marketing) Model	Contradictory (Polarizing) Model
Constant	2.63*	2.36*	1.96*
Gender (Female)	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01
Higher Education	-0.14*	-0.16*	-0.12*
Political Knowledge	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03
Sense of Deprivation	0.39*	0.38*	0.35*
Following Serious Newspapers		0.23*	0.25*
Following Popular Newspapers		-0.02	-0.04
Watching Entertainment Programs		0.02	0.01
Watching News Programs		-0.15	-0.12
Preference for Serious Content		0.01	-0.02
Preference for Entertainment Content		0.05	0.05*
Preference for Popular Content			0.09
Preference for Anti-Elite Content			0.06*
Preference for Monocultural Content			-0.01
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.308	0.321	0.335
F-Value	71.34*	34.20*	28.63*

**Table 2.** Factors affecting the exclusionary dimension of populism.

Variable	Mobilizational (Incitement) Model	Entertainment (Popular Marketing) Model	Contradictory (Polarizing) Model
Constant	1.89*	1.72*	1.54*
Gender (Female)	-0.12	-0.11	-0.10
Age	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
Higher Education	-0.31*	-0.33*	-0.29*

Variable	Mobilizational (Incitement) Model	Entertainment (Popular Marketing) Model	Contradictory (Polarizing) Model
Political Knowledge	-0.08*	-0.07*	-0.06
Sense of Deprivation	0.42*	0.40*	0.38*
Following Official Channels		-0.18*	-0.16*
Following Local Channels		0.21	0.19
Watching Religious Programs		0.15*	0.13*
Preference for Serious Content		-0.04	-0.05
Preference for Entertainment Content		0.07	0.06*
Preference for Popular Content			0.05
Preference for Exclusionary Content			0.24*
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.287	0.302	0.324
F-Value	65.21*	31.45*	30.12*

**Table 3.** Regression analysis of the anti-elite dimension.

Variables	Mobilizational (Incitement) Model	Entertainment (Popular Marketing) Model	Contradictory (Polarizing) Model
Demographic Factors			
Gender (Female)	-0.08	-0.07	-0.05
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01
Higher Education	-0.15*	-0.17*	-0.14*
Non-Media Factors			
Political Knowledge	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
Feelings of Injustice	0.38*	0.36*	0.34*
Media Habits			
Following Official Channels		0.22*	0.24*
Following Local Channels		-0.03	-0.05
Media Preferences			
Preference for Entertainment Programs		0.06	0.05*
Preference for Popular Content			0.10
Preference for Anti-Elite Content			0.07*
Model Indicators			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.32	0.34
F	28.45*	15.32*	14.28*

**Table 4.** Regression analysis of the exclusionary dimension.

Variables	Mobilizational (Incitement) Model	Entertainment (Popular Marketing) Model	Contradictory (Polarizing) Model
Demographic Factors			
Gender (Female)	-0.19*	-0.18*	-0.12
Age	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
Higher Education	-0.32*	-0.34*	-0.30*
Non-Media Factors			
Political Knowledge	-0.09*	-0.08*	-0.08*
Sense of Injustice	0.60*	0.57*	0.45*
Media Habits			
Following Official Channels		-0.35	-0.13
Following Local Channels		0.38*	0.28
Media Preferences			
Preference for Single-Side Content			0.30*
Model Indicators			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.47	0.54
F	42.15*	28.47*	35.21*

### 3. Results and Discussion

#### Regression analysis of the anti-elite dimension in populist trends:

Iraqi media is undergoing major transformations amid a complex political and social environment, where populist discourses are emerging as an influential tool in shaping public opinion. The results of a regression analysis of the anti-elite dimension of populist discourse reveal three main models that interact with the Iraqi context in different ways: the mobilization (incitement) model, the entertainment (populist marketing) model, and the antagonistic (polarizing) model.

The strongest determinant of responding toward populist communication in all three modes is the state of deprivation, exhibiting a high positive predictive factor (0.39, 0.38, 0.35). Here is a memoir of an Iraqi social reality marked by underemployment and institutional corruption that conditions the reaction described above to discourses promising more fundamental change or casting threats at the ruling elites. In contrast, education level has a clear negative effect (-0.14, -0.16, -0.12), indicating that more educated individuals tend to be more skeptical of simplistic populist rhetoric, while less educated audiences find it to offer easy answers to complex problems.

The mobilization model relies on direct, emotional rhetoric and often appears in talk shows or news programs that exaggerate the conflict between "the people" and "the elite."

The entertainment model appears through programs that present politics in an engaging way, such as television interviews with "charismatic" figures portrayed as saviors, or the use of dramatic suspense to present issues. Here, we find that preference for entertainment content is positively associated (0.05) with response to populist rhetoric, especially when presented in an engaging manner.

The antagonistic model relies on polarization, as analysis shows that following tabloid newspapers and preferring anti-elite content (0.06) reinforces this model. In Iraq, we see this clearly in some channels that promote sectarian or identity-based discourse, which increases social division.

The results reveal that following serious newspapers is positively related (0.23, 0.25) to both the entertainment and contrasting models, perhaps because a portion of the audience seeks explanations for their crises in even "serious" content, but may fall into the trap of populist rhetoric if the newspapers themselves present simplistic narratives. Meanwhile, watching news programs has a negative effect (-0.15, -0.12), which may reflect either viewers' skepticism of the official media narrative or their attraction to more emotional populist alternatives.

### **Factors affecting the exclusionary dimension of populism**

The results of the regression analysis of the exclusionary dimension of populist discourse provide profound insight into how social and media factors interact with the three models of populism in the Iraqi context. These models – mobilization, entertainment and antagonism – are not separate processes but intersect to produce an exclusionary discourse against certain groups, either by calling them directly for incitement, reinforcing divisions or marketing the speech with attractive populist language.

Once more, the experience of deprivation is clearly the most relevant predictor for supporting exclusionary populist speech patterns with high coefficients (0.42, 0.40, 0.38) in all models treated together. Iraq's failure to include a broad swathe of society in modernity has created an informational vacuum that is filled with narratives that blame the "other" – by sect, ethnicity or ideology – for its panoply of crises. . On the other hand, the higher the level of education (-0.31, -0.33, -0.29) and the knowledge of political facts (-0.08, -0.07, -0.06), the lower the demand for exclusionary discourse, which indicates that critical awareness could help people not to simplify their social conflict. Older adults (0.02 across models) also show increased support for this discourse, though that could be attributed to their being more traditionally-identifying or a products of historic conflicts. The results show that regular viewing of official channels (-0.18, -0.16) reduces acceptance of exclusionary discourse, perhaps because they offer a more balanced narrative, albeit one that sometimes lacks credibility in the eyes of the public. On the contrary, engaging with local channels (0.21; 0.19) and religious programs (0.15; 0.13) bolster exclusionist tendencies, again more so in the entertainment and contrast models. This used to be a sign that some media outlets in Iraq, especially sectarian or local ones, but will they raise the division of speech formulated (and this means: "\* group" against "\* other.").

The discriminations for the preferred content (0.07, 0.06) and exclusionary content (0.24) are correlated with those derived from the opposite model (p, 002), suggesting that there is an T.V shows that do not smack us in the face with fun, but glorify other messages like fear of "those" people or being made a stereotype.

This analysis uncovers that exclusionary populist discourse in Iraq is not a cause and effect fait accompli, but rather the resultant product of intersectionality between:

- Social and economic crises that heighten injustice perceptions,
- Media policies that encourage sub-identities at the expense of national identity,
- A lack of media alternatives that provide sober analysis of hostilities.

The absence of accountability or professional standards are one thing, yet for the most part they still feed off the vulnerable. People who without their proper learning stage is very little indeed.

### **Regression analysis of the anti-elite dimension**

With the collapse of anti-government populism, the interdependence between Iraqi society and media creates a complex net of contacts. A situation of high polarization structures is in place, as nicely put by media critic Michael Rutherford. Fragmentization Democracy The single most powerful predictor of support for antigovernment rhetoric was displeasure with one's own condition ( $\beta = 0.38, 0.36, 0.34$ ) and so many Iraqis thought that social and political planes were inextricably linked. This is the kind of atmosphere in which populism, eager to point accusing fingers and get all over the guy who holds power – say the proponents of modernization theory -- can flourish. On the other hand, people with higher education were slightly more inclined to identify less with either side of elite

opinion ( $\beta = -0.15, -0.17, -0.14$ ). This suggests that more-educated individuals likely use whatever yardstick they apply more awkwardly. Such an education brings simpler stories, which amounts to a rift within the belief system between an educated minority and most people.

The findings throw up an astonishing contradiction between at least two media habits. However, when watching the official channels, the coefficients for local channels (0.23 and 0.25) are not statistically significant. That is to say, a big three News star like Megan Kelly on fox counts as part of the mass media family-- because all of these stars coalesced have more than Single digits of millions viewers.

It may well be an indicator of what is happening in the national context that many ordinary people seem not to believe information they get from their government, either online or off-line.

### **Media selection significantly affects audience attitude**

Preferences for diversionist (0.06, 0.05) and populist entertainment content (0.10) are positively related with the entertainment and antagonistic models preferences for anti-elite content (0.07) seems to contribute to the polarization model. These findings demonstrate that entertainment television can be a box for populist messages even though hongkong audiences go on treating it solely as a form of amusement

The power of explanation in these three models extend from side to The model polarization provides a  $R^2 = .34$  compare to  $.32$  for the marketing model and  $.31$  mobilization Medium-specific features of art and literature widen the polarizing effect populism has over tactics more so than its open incitement to discord.

Can be said to move from more recently-serving the general system -- "supplying" to inflating and then shaping social splits political y. Instead of serving as an impartial host, some have clearly become political agents for carrying on the overarching suspicion and contempt for the ruling elite.

Now the pressing problem is to create an Iraqi media model that reflects public values legality and carrying capacity while at the same time neither falling into reductionism nor shoulders up to new submission these hardships bring. This involves media reform. To develop refined media literacy among the people, so that they are able to distinguish between good news coverage and prevarication; and The venue where the conversation between social partners takes place in an ordered manner, not just through missile drops To present the differences in complexity between one group and next, instead of sticking slogans revolution under the carpet to let stop happening.

### **Regression analysis of the exclusionary dimension**

The problem is how to establish a mass media which may serve people without either poisoning or panicking them. The way forward is to rethink media regulation and policy; what will be needed is for consumers to access journalism which no longer serves as an ancient Chinese lantern. They must take it in hand and mold their opinions about society informed by citizens of the latest standing of our national thought on any given subject. Each individual will need a little bit of public media culture; without it they will be unable to do very well in their roles. So we might see more discussions involving heavyweights from both camps. These would not be simply "us" against "them" affairs. Instead there would be face-totally equal exchanges between quality solvents for difficult problems. With audiences on both sides listening and learning (which is always what good debate requires). This conclusion can be taken as a reflection of the present day societal situation, in which public opinion is such that it is even open to an airing of conflicting views.

Advocating for an "exclusive" (as opposed to inclusive) solution to any problem. Multilevel logic technique was brought into play to look at other factors may be related to behaviors that exclude;a random latent variable model'arrangeds all covariates into e-modules, and employing separate reported errors for precision was much better Bo.

Surveys show that women are more opposed than men to this form of discrimination. Another ANOVA was used to examine the family patterns.

It seems that age (0.02) is positively correlated with both forms of exclusionary discourse, while education has a negative effect on them (-0.32 to -0.34; -0.30) and political knowledge lowers them (-0.09 to -0.08). This is further evidence that cognitive processes play a significant role in influencing people's reaction to banal discourse. The ways in which the media behaves conceal deep secrets. It is not clear whether attention to the official channel has a significant effect upon such needs. However, we do find that attention toward local channels (0.38, 28) is significantly and positively related (pilot survey was used as our sampling basis for these variables) to exclusionary attitudes, especially in the case of entertainment models and hate runnings. It is illustrative of the role that some local media outlets have played in prioritization of sub-identities than a larger national identity. The polarizing model provides the best fit to data (Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.54$ ). (0.45 and 0.47, respectively), as well as weak evidence that preference of one-sided content also play a key role in its persistence (0.30).

The findings reveal a worrying trend in the Iraqi media's behavior: legitimate, exclusionary ideas are brought to the fore by means of populist talk that simplifies complex problems into simple solutions. Thus, this perhaps finds its fullest expression in partisan chat shows, silly talk'.

The task of Iraqi media is to build bridges of communication and transcend barriers instead of being weaponized.

This involves changing the media policy in favor of pluralism, creating self-regulation mechanisms and commuting journalists to write differently about the topics that create those conflicts. Given the widespread consumption of media by the public – particularly via social platforms that frequently reproduce exclusionary rhetoric – media literacy initiatives are also imperative in facilitating critical public engagement with these discourses.

#### 4. Conclusion

Media in Iraq Unrest have increasingly become significant actors to influence the minds of the public with populism. This article uses three overlapping models of communication to explain such communications, that of incitative agitation, marketable entertainment and polarizing political conflict. Although the three models differ from context themselves, all are primarily based on a sense of injustice and exclusion as central to any explanation of how receptive reaction is to populist messages (with high and stable coefficients ranging between 0.39 and 0.60). This reflects a social reality plagued by worsening corruption and economic inequality, which fuels public response to discourses that reduce crises to a conflict between "the people" and the "elite" or "the other." In contrast, higher education (-0.12 to -0.34) and political knowledge (-0.03 to -0.09) play a mitigating role in these tendencies, confirming that critical awareness weakens the acceptance of simplistic discourse. Demographic differences also emerge, with females (-0.19) and older adults (0.02) showing different responses, suggesting the influence of cultural factors and historical experiences.

On the media side, the results show glaring contradictions. For the entertainment and contrast model, exposure to official channels (-0.18) causes a decrease in normalizing exclusionary discourse, whereas viewing local channels (0.28) and religious programs (0.15) has the opposite effect. Strongly related to polarizing discourse of thematised television is both liking of entertainment content (0.05–0.07) and one-sided content (0.30), an exposure-measure that illustrates, as stated above, how some television programs indirectly function as advertisement for stereotyped or exclusive othering (Cohen, 2007).

It's our model, which is derived from 78 data accounts for the greatest variance ( $R=0.54$ ). Broadcasting to a polarized audience through either sensationalist entertainment or government media involved in armed conflicts, Iraqi media makes conflict to some

extent inevitable. This model of communication, however, still has one major flaw: It means that right and wrong are no longer questions. When you can't win, do not exist--thus it becomes easy to find a solution merely by magic ending this or bringing that to a stop (p. 143). If the popular media does not talk about crises from which they stem, there will be no such thing as "crisis". If one does mention a crisis it is ended the end of all ends; while contemplative talks disappear and only the transliterated (another way to put it might be "homosexuals") get applause--because people won't listen anymore after being told "the same old story." The media must forge debate, engage society in self-critique. It should also enforce more generally accepted codes of personal conduct. On this question both government and people will either turn the press into an harmonious force or a juggler flitting between the two, depending which way policymakers choose to go. Education ( $\beta = -0.14$  to  $-0.34$ ) and political information ( $\beta = -0.03$  to  $-0.09$ ), by contrast, diminish susceptibility to populist discourse: the more one is informed and concerned citizens become, less they appreciate de-complicated slogans

Media trends further reflect this dynamic. Access to official ( $\beta = -0.18$ ) contributes a freedom from exclusionist attitudes, while local channels ( $\beta = -0.28$ ) and religious programs ( $\beta = -0.15$ ) lead to the reinforcement of such attitudes. Also entertainment preferences ( $\beta = 0.05-0.07$ ) and one-sidedness of content ( $\beta = -0.30$ ) are closely associated to greater polarization, indicating that also non-news programming may reproduce stereotypes and narrow exposure to difference perspectives.

The competing model has an R of 0.54. At best media covers what I see as the two hearts is its function by spreading malice and not quenching it with good itself. Some networks instead of promoting dialogue among people with whom they disagree, use inflammatory language to fuel disputes. This is also an important problem for research: How can Iraq's media not only achieve justice, but also avoid perpetrating the very generalizations that underlie social disintegration? It's not just a problem for media policy. We must also look at the content of journalism and help individuals develop their own reading skills; that way, hopefully then people with no protection from a different heritage for learning things will be better equipped or at least not in any danger of becoming trapped in their own narrow Partisan boxes. Media has the power to unite people and helps citizens involved in facts negotiation. The task before us is to find a way that we can guide our media out of conflict and turn their 'moderation' into a word for combat is language. Let them all speak equally. Then they just trade in ideas 'if ego keep at peace which everybody has that is profit without harm or want and so forth for anyone's life to become a living'.

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